

Moral Psychology Is Relationship Regulation: Moral Motives for Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality

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Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread. To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. We extend relational models theory (Fiske, 1991) to identify 4 fundamental and distinct moral motives. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The 4 moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in where they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), relationship regulation theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and “impure” acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed. This approach facilitates clearer understanding of moral perspectives we disagree with and provides a template for how to influence moral motives and practices in the world.

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In 2006, Zahra al-Azzo was kidnapped and raped near her home in Damascus, Syria. Following her safe return, her older brother stabbed and murdered her in her sleep. In response to his killing her, Zahra’s family held a large celebration that night. According to the United Nations Population Fund, 5,000 similar “honor killings” occur each year. (Zoepf, 2007)

Around the world, people have disparate beliefs and practices related to responsibility, revenge, taboos, violence, and acceptable lifestyles. Faced with such extensive diversity and disagreement about what is right, just, necessary, or fair, we must consider the bases for these competing judgments and behaviors. Is there a theory of moral psychology that can account for the sense of obligation felt by Zahra Al-Azzo’s family in killing her and their

subsequent celebration of it *and* the horror, outrage, and shock experienced by most Western readers who hear such stories?

In the present paper, we argue that to elucidate the bases for moral judgment, we must abandon the assumption that moral judgments are based on features of actions independent of the social-relational contexts in which they occur (e.g., Did the action cause harm? Was the action unfair? Was the action impure?). Rather, we must reconceptualize moral psychology as embedded in our social-relational cognition, such that moral judgments and behaviors emerge out of the specific obligations and transgressions entailed by particular types of social relationships (e.g., Did the action support us against them? Did it go against orders from above? Did you respond in kind?). In so doing, it will become evident that moral intuitions are not based on asocial principles of right actions, such as prohibitions against intentionally causing harm (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Turiel, 1983) and inequality (Turiel, 1983) or concerns with “purity” (Haidt, 2007). Rather, moral intuitions are defined by the particular types of social relationships in which they occur. In its strongest form, a social-relational approach to moral psychology posits that the moral status of actions cannot be determined independent of the social-relational contexts in which they take place. Rather, any given action will be judged as right, just, fair, honorable, pure, virtuous, or morally correct when it occurs in some social-relational contexts and will be judged as wrong when it occurs in other social-relational contexts.

By integrating moral psychology into social-relational cognition, we unify findings and theory from moral, cultural, developmental, and social psychology to provide insight into social-

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relational evaluation, cooperation, conflict, and violence. A theory of moral psychology should provide a framework for understanding judgments of virtue, notions of fairness, systems of justice, in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, care and apathy, prejudice, loyalty, leadership and followership, approach–avoidance, and moralized forms of violence, such as spanking, whipping, capital punishment, revenge, torture, honor killing, and genocide. Our social-relational approach to moral psychology predicts that (a) there are distinct moral motives, obligations, and violations that correspond to four basic types of social relationships and that (b) constituting different social-relational models evokes their corresponding moral motives and evaluations.

Whereas other approaches assume there are bases to moral judgment whose expression may be *biased* by social-relational context, we begin by drawing on the immense body of literature on social relationships to identify the basic kinds of relationships people perceive and construct that *determine* the morally required response in a given situation. Subsequently, we analyze the distinct obligations and transgressions that each type of social relationship entails to yield four fundamental moral motives underlying our social-relational psychology: Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality. This social-relational approach leads to the insight that universality in moral psychology results from all individuals in all cultures basing their moral judgments and behaviors on the same set of moral motives for regulating social relationships. Diversity in moral judgment, emotion, motivation, and behavior results from individuals, institutions, ideologies, and cultures employing different social-relational models or different implementations of the same models in any given domain of life.

By taking a social-relational approach, we will find that some deep moral disagreements reflect genuinely different moral positions embedded in social relationships, groups, practices, institutions, and cultures and cannot simply be attributed to differences in knowledge or logical reasoning among competing parties. Consequently, there are legitimate moral perspectives that cannot be directly or systematically reconciled with each other. (For similar claims, see Berlin, 1969; Bolender, 2003; Fiske, 1990; Goldman, 1993; Harman, 1996; Wong, 1984, 2006.) Philosophers commonly accept a version of such moral pluralism in the trade-off between principles of upholding rights and preventing harm. The present paper argues for a different kind of pluralism based on the distinct kinds of social relationships that people perceive, construct, sanction, resist, and seek to sustain or terminate. As a consequence, this approach predicts that some acts and practices that some people perceive as evil actually have a moral basis in the psychology of the people who commit them. We do not have to condone these practices, but if we are to have any hope of opposing them, we do have to understand them for what they are: morally motivated acts, not simply errors in judgment, limitations of knowledge, or failures of self-control.

The Need for a Social-Relational Morality

Post-Enlightenment philosophical approaches to morality emphasize that moral judgments ought to be based on principles that are abstract, logical, and universal and thus independent of an individual's social position, personal relationships, or future interpersonal consequences (Kant, 1785/1989; Rawls, 2005; for a review, see Kramnick, 1995). Cognitive–developmental, rationalist,

and some empiricist approaches to scientific moral psychology work within this framework. As a consequence, in describing moral judgments they make a conceptual distinction between moral intuitions or reasoning, on the one hand, and the social biases that may distort expression of such judgments, on the other (for a similar critique, see Miller & Bersoff, 1992; for a review of how morality became distinct from social-relational context in philosophy, see MacIntyre, 2007; in psychology, see Haidt, 2008).

Thus, when Piaget (1932/1965) observed young children judging that certain actions in the game of marbles were wrong because they imagined authorities said so, while older children generated their own rules as a group, he assumed that young children's behavior was due in part to social constraints, such as lack of freedom to generate their own rules, and that egalitarian values would emerge in the absence of such social biases. Kohlberg (1981) used responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas to argue that individuals' moral development progressed from an orientation of avoiding punishment toward a respect for social contracts and eventually to the discovery of universal ethical principles. Deviations from this progression were thought to be due to “non-moral” biases, such as social pressure (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Krebs & Denton, 2005). The social-interactionist perspective (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987) is founded on a distinction between social conventions and moral judgments. Social conventions, such as raising your hand in class or wearing a school uniform, are context specific, authority dependent, and rule contingent. In contrast, moral judgments, such as the perception that hitting a classmate is wrong, are based on rules that are universal, independent of authority, and intrinsically linked to concerns with preventing harms and upholding equal rights and justice. Failures to uphold these principles (e.g., in-group favoritism) are attributed to inadequate intergroup experiences, coercive cultural institutions, or mistaken beliefs of previous generations (Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006).

By adopting this distinction between moral psychology *per se* and the social influences that distort moral judgment, the cognitive–developmental and rationalist approaches to moral psychology largely separated themselves from social psychological studies of prescriptively immoral real-world behaviors and anthropological findings regarding diverse moral practices across cultures. Interested in how Nazi officers could commit inhumane acts during World War II, Milgram (1963) found that some participants would obey an authority figure even if they believed they were administering potentially deadly electric shocks to another person. Interested in understanding how people treated those from different groups, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) demonstrated that even minimal information about group membership, such as participants' art preferences, could result in the choice to maximize the differences between the rewards given to the in-group relative to the out-group, rather than to maximize total rewards for everyone.

At the same time, anthropologists and historians have identified vast differences in moral attitudes across cultures and time. For example, in the context of sex and gender, is it morally permissible for people of the same gender, or of different races, to have sexual relations, and should they have the right to marry? May people engage in sexual relations simply for pleasure, or should sex be restricted to marriage? Should men and women choose whom they

marry, or should their elders choose for them? In marriage, does sex have to be a joint choice, or can one spouse compel the other? Should men or women be allowed to have multiple spouses simultaneously? Should women have equal rights in relationships with men, or should men have complete authority over their daughters, sisters, and wives? These are questions that elicit strong moral judgments and little consensus cross-culturally. Yet, by distinguishing between moral judgment and the social-relational context in which it takes place, we must attribute variation in judgments and behaviors to “nonmoral” social or selfish biases, such as the relationships among the people involved, the influences of cultural institutions, or differences in cognitive and emotional development that bias an individual’s ability to articulate and follow “true” moral judgments.

Morality Embedded in Social Relationships

The a priori categorization of social-relational context as separate from bases for moral judgment is ironic, given the rich history in social psychology of demonstrating the influence of context in nearly every aspect of social behavior and cognition (S. T. Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). For example, even if helping is cognitively salient, individuals are less likely to help a stranger if they are preoccupied with another social obligation (Darley & Batson, 1973). Likewise, cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists have demonstrated that nearly all reasoning and judgment depends deeply on the framing of the problem or decision and that genuine preferences may not even exist in the abstract but, rather, are constructed relative to particular contexts (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Slovic, 1995; Thaler, 1999). For example, in moral dilemmas designed to contrast deontological with utilitarian reasoning, preferences change depending on whether options are framed in terms of lives saved or lost, or depending simply on the order in which moral dilemmas are encountered (Haidt & Baron, 1996; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Rai & Holyoak, 2010). Finally, evolutionary analyses of cooperation have shown that propensities to act morally only evolve (whether by biological or cultural selection) if they are responsive to the specific interactive strategies and prospects of social partners and if they take into account reputational consequences and the likelihood of third party punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003, 2005).

The literature in social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology suggests moral psychology may be inseparable from its social-relational context. In the remainder of the paper, we propose a theory of moral psychology in which moral motives, judgments, sanctions, redress, emotions, and actions are embedded in social-relational models for living in groups. We consider the various types of social relationships people seek and perceive and the distinct moral obligations and transgressions these relationships entail. From this perspective, our sense of morality functions to facilitate the generation and maintenance of long-term social-cooperative relationships with others (Fiske, 2002, 2010a; Frank, 1988; Joyce, 2006). As a consequence, fundamentally different types of social relationships will entail fundamentally different moralities.

We refer to this approach as *relationship regulation*. It is predicated on the notion that in any relationship individuals are presented with opportunities for exploiting or otherwise taking ad-

vantage of their relational partners for any number of reasons (e.g., short-term temptations, shortsighted selfishness) in ways that violate models for social relationships. Actions that violate the social-relational model that participants and observers are using are thereby *immoral*. In order for relationships to function, people need competing motives that lead them to regulate and sustain social relations by controlling their own behavior and sanctioning others; without such relationship-regulating motives, relationships would collapse. Thus, relationship regulation theory (RR) posits that

the core of our moral psychology consists of motives for evaluating and guiding one’s own and others’ judgments and behaviors (including speech, emotions, attitudes, and intentions) with reference to prescriptive models for social relationships. Failing to behave in accord with relational prescriptions is considered a moral transgression and leads to emotions such as guilt, shame, disgust, envy, or outrage. These emotions proximally motivate sanctions including apologies, redress and rectifications, self-punishment, and modulation of or termination of the relationship. Moral psychology also encompasses concerns about and obligations to others with whom one has relationships, together with associated positive emotions such as compassion, loyalty, and awe.

We use the term *motive* to indicate that our moral psychology provides not only the relevant moral evaluations but also the motivational force to pursue the accompanying behaviors that are required to regulate and sustain relationships (for an earlier use of “moral motive” in psychology see Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006). Although the motives tacitly guide moral judgments and actions, we do not necessarily expect people to be able to spontaneously explicate their judgments in terms of the moral motives or endorse these judgments upon conscious reflection, as they might for explicitly held, ideologically articulated moral principles (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009; see Levy, 1973, on hypo/hypercognition).

In addition to being cognizant of moral motives that are necessary to maintain functioning social relationships, people must be attuned to individual characteristics that make people good prospects as relationship partners in some or all types of relationships. Virtues, such as honesty, wisdom, and kindness, and vices, such as laziness, insensitivity, and recklessness, are quasi-moral (Miller, 2008) traits that are not tied to particular moral motives but are important for evaluating the social-relational potential of other individuals. Diligence, self-control, attentiveness, and energy are traits that improve the prospects for fruitful and rewarding relationships with individuals, while their stupidity, forgetfulness, and lack of self-control detract from them. Other virtues and vices may be somewhat specific to particular types of relationships: A quick-thinking person may make a good military leader, while someone who fails to adequately pay attention to details may not be a good person to choose as your accountant. But all virtues and vices affect others’ motivation to form or sustain social relationships. Moreover, their valence may change depending on particular sociohistorical circumstances and contexts. In some times and places, frugality may be quite a virtue, while in other times and places it is most morally praiseworthy to “live to the fullest” by spending, consuming, and giving lavishly. In short, virtues and vices form a penumbra around moral motives, per se.

Certain combinations of relationships also have moral implications that are not features of any of the component relationships and motives (Fiske, 2010b). For example, if you are my friend, it is a moral betrayal to me for you to help my enemy. A man married to a girl's mother should not have sex with the girl. Children of the same parents should be kind to each other. Thus, there are aspects of RR that concern the entailments of certain social relationships for other relationships or the immorality of certain combinations of relationships. Although the present paper focuses on identifying moral motives that function within different kinds of social relations, virtues and metarelational combinations of relationships are important features of RR in the broader sense.

In the same sense that the scientific concept of mass is not identical to the folk concept of weight, RR is a scientific model of moral psychology and as such does not capture everything that is entailed by the folk model of "moral." Indeed, it could not do so because the folk model is different in every culture. Likewise, it may encompass aspects of psychology not construed as moral in some folk models. However, RR is intended to capture much of what is meant in lay terms by *moral* while still maintaining the advantages of a theoretically derived, deductively coherent enterprise. Thus, we posit the parsimonious theory that morality functions to sustain social relationships, and as such our moral psychology changes with corresponding changes in our social-relational psychology. If RR encompasses a broad domain of important psychosocial phenomena that can be clearly and simply explained in terms of relationship regulation, it is a good theory, regardless of whether the phenomena that it encompasses correspond precisely to the folk domain of moral in any particular culture. The scientific concept of *force* does not map exactly onto the (variable and often fuzzy) folk concept of force in any culture, but it is nonetheless an invaluable concept—indeed, much better for describing and explaining physics than is the folk concept.

Theoretical approaches that have considered the possibility of a social-relational morality include that of Joan Miller (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990), whose experiments found that among Indian participants and some Westerners, interpersonal obligations were often conceptualized in moral terms. Similarly, role theories (Biddle & Thomas, 1966; Goffman, 1959), relational theories of identity (Brewer & Gardner, 1996), and cultural approaches to social psychology (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Morris & Leung, 2000; Triandis, 1989) posit that at any given time, people are behaving in accord with a particular social role instantiated in culture that includes particular moral obligations and norms. At the same time, considerations of special obligations in philosophy (Jeske, 2008) posit that in addition to the "natural duties" owed toward all people, there is a class of duties that apply to a subset of persons, such as the duties of parents toward children. Finally, preferences for different forms of distributive justice oriented toward equity, equality, and need vary based on social domains and the groups people find themselves in, such as families or work interactions (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Deutsch, 1975; Folger, Sheppard, & Buttram, 1995). Although these are important contributions, the impact of existing relational conceptualizations on the broader study of moral psychology has been minimized because these conceptualizations fail to provide a grounded account of the types of obligations, roles, relational identities, or relevant social domains that exist, how many there are, or how they vary across cultures. Thus, if our sense of morality

emerges out of our need to regulate our social relationships, we must begin with a proper taxonomy of social relationships in order to identify the bases for core moral judgments and behaviors.

Relational Models Theory

Fiske (1991, 1992, 2000; Fiske & Haslam, 2005) proposed relational models theory (RMT) as a means for understanding and characterizing motivated coordination of social relationships. According to RMT, there are four basic mental models, or schemas, that we employ to coordinate nearly all social interactions. These models are communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing (MP).

We use CS models when we perceive people in the same group or dyad as undifferentiated and equivalent in a salient feature, while others are not. Families, teams, brotherhoods, military units, nationalities, ethnicities, and some close friendships are often thought of in CS terms. When we rank or order individuals along a particular dimension, we are using an AR model. AR allows us to know the relative position of individuals in a linear hierarchy, such as between dominant and subordinate individuals, adults and children, military officers, and people of different castes, ages, or genders in many societies. When people use EM models they attend to additive interval differences in order to achieve and maintain balance. EM is manifest in activities such as turn taking, in-kind reciprocity, even distributions, and randomization procedures such as coin flipping. MP relations involve the use of ratios and rates to compare otherwise noncomparable commodities on a common metric, such as in the monetary exchanges between buyers and sellers in a marketplace or costs and benefits of a social decision.

It is important to note that in any complex relationship between two or more persons, individuals often employ multiple models at the same time to navigate different aspects of different social-relational interactions (Fiske, 1991). For example, Goldman (1993, pp. 344–345) wrote that "two friends may share tapes and records freely with each other (CS), work on a task at which one is an expert and imperiously directs the other (AR), divide equally the cost of gas on a trip (EM), and transfer a bicycle from one to the other for a market-value price (MP)." It is likely that such combinations of models are reflective of most complex relationships (Fiske, 2004). As we discuss in greater detail later, each of the relational models can be enacted, or constituted, in a variety of ways. Constituting a model incorrectly can often be as morally inappropriate as employing the wrong model altogether. Although not the primary focus in this paper, such moral violations are similar to notions of procedural justice, whereby individuals often care more about the process by which outcomes are achieved than the outcomes themselves (for a review, see Lind & Tyler, 1988).

RMT is based on a synthesis of classical social theory (major influences include Durkheim, 1893/2008; Marx, 1848/1972; Piaget, 1932/1965; Ricoeur, 1967; Tönnies, 1887/1957; Weber, 1905/1958), integrated with later research in social psychology and related fields, together with ethnological comparisons of many cultures and ethnographic fieldwork in depth among the Moose of Burkina Faso. Since the theory's original formulation, scores of studies of diverse aspects of cognition and behavior, using a great variety of methods and data analytic techniques, have validated RMT (for a review of RMT, see Haslam, 2004; for a bibliography

of relevant studies, see www.rmt.ucla.edu). These studies include cluster (Haslam & Fiske, 1992), taxometric (Haslam, 1994), and factor-analytic (Haslam & Fiske, 1999) analyses; formal analyses (Jackendoff, 1992, 1999); memory (Fiske & Haslam, 1997; Fiske, Haslam, & Fiske, 1991) and decision-making (McGraw, Tetlock, & Kristel, 2003) experiments; ethnography (Whitehead, 2000); neuroscientific investigations (Iacoboni et al., 2004); and correlational studies of psychopathology (Caralis & Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Reichert, & Fiske, 2002). RMT has also proven useful in understanding many real-world phenomena and numerous theoretical issues ranging from the allocation of household chores (Goodnow, 1998) to perceptions of distributive justice (Connelly & Folger, 2004; Folger et al., 1995). The structures of these four models appear to be fundamental (Bolender, 2010), and they map onto the four basic scale types for organizing relations in data (Stevens, 1946). Thus, CS is homologous with nominal (categorical) measurement, wherein the organizing principle is group membership; formally, it consists of equivalence relations. AR maps onto ordinal measurement scaling, wherein the linear order of individuals is salient but differences cannot be quantified; mathematically, it is a linear ordering. EM corresponds to interval measurement, wherein differences can be added and subtracted to track imbalances; it has the structure of an ordered Abelian group. MP has the structure of a ratio scale with a defined zero point: It is an Archimedean ordered field (Fiske, 1992).

Moral Motives

By organizing and parsing social-relational context into four basic models for social interaction, we can move beyond ad hoc descriptions of roles, relational identities, special obligations, or social domains and develop a theory of the different moral motives that are crucial for driving individuals to generate and maintain the types of social relations described in RMT (Bolender, 2003; Fiske, 2002; Fiske & Mason, 1990; Goldman, 1993; Jackendoff, 1999).¹ But positing that moral motives within relational models form the core of our moral psychology still leaves open the question of just how moral psychology is embedded in our social relationships. Thus, whereas RMT identifies the different forms and structures of social relationships, our aim is to examine the moral obligations entailed by different models, the ways in which models can be violated and thus lead to redress or breakdown of a relationship, and how people are motivated to adhere to these obligations and violations in order to generate and maintain adaptive, functioning social relationships. Although much of the content of particular moral judgments will still depend on how the relevant social relationships are construed (e.g., who is the superior vs. subordinate, what is the extent of the damage caused, what counts as a turn and whose turn it is), the key to our approach is that it will identify the criteria upon which moral judgments are made and behaviors enacted. Thus, when employing an MP model and its corresponding moral motive, individuals may disagree about the nature of the cost–benefit calculation, but they do not disagree that conducting a cost–benefit calculation is the correct course of action (even though such calculation might be despised when employing other models and their corresponding motives). The moral motives within the four social-relational models are directed toward Unity (CS), Hierarchy (AR), Equality (EM), and Proportionality (MP). These motives are responsible for guiding our moral judgments

and behaviors, including when we are thinking about our own or others' actions, when we are responding to others as a second party, and when we are observing or sanctioning others as a third party.

Unity

The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Hutu brothers. They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.

—Excerpt from the Hutu Ten Commandments, propaganda used to spur anti-Tutsi sentiment prior to the Rwandan genocide (Berry & Berry, 1999).

The moral motive in CS models is Unity. Unity is directed toward caring for and supporting the integrity of in-groups through a sense of collective responsibility and common fate. If someone is in need, we must protect and provide for that person; if someone is harmed, the entire group feels transgressed against and must respond. If an in-group member is contaminated or commits a moral violation, the entire group bears responsibility and feels tainted and shamed until it cleanses itself. A threat to the group or its integrity, or to any member of it, is felt to be a threat to all.

Unity is partially captured by conceptions of a moral circle (Singer, 1981) and the construct of moral inclusion–exclusion (Clayton & Opatow, 2003; Opatow, 1990; Staub, 1990, 1992), whereby only those who are included in the group are within the scope of moral concern. Thus, within in-groups, Unity requires that we give or provide aid based on need without regard to earned merit or any expectation of later reciprocation, as echoed in analyses of communal relationships and friendship (Clark & Mills, 1979; Fiske, 1991; Silk, 2003), need-based forms of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975; Folger et al., 1995), Gilligan's (1982) ethics of care, and theories of in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1999). For example, when asked to complete a task with a partner, participants were more likely to use pens with the same ink color if they were friends rather than strangers, suggesting that they were not concerned with who received credit for the task (Clark, 1984, Studies 2 and 3). Cross-culturally, food-sharing norms are common in small-scale societies. Among the Ache foragers of Paraguay, hunters often receive only a small portion of their own kills, and families who cannot hunt are still provided for (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Gurven, 2004). Moreover, individuals report that they are most likely to sacrifice themselves to save those in their own group (Swann, Gomez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010), as well as to spend their time and money to hunt down those who have harmed someone in their group (Lieberman & Linke, 2007). Such preferential treatment toward in-group members extends

¹ The validity of the basic tenet that moral psychology is embedded in social relationships does not depend on the more specific claim that the four relational models are the foundations of morality, of course. But we make this additional claim because there is solid theoretical grounding and ample empirical evidence for believing that the relational models are the frameworks for most social-relational cognition (Fiske & Haslam, 2005; Haslam, 2004). Moreover, RMT enables us to understand how moral psychology is connected to culture, social development, emotions, neurobiology, phylogeny, and evolution.

beyond cases of need because Unity dictates that people within CS relations can take freely from each other, as notions of individual ownership are minimized and active accounting of exchanges is morally prohibited. At the same time, all those within the CS relation share responsibility for the wrongdoing of a single group member. Lickel and colleagues (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001; Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003) have found that such collective responsibility for wrongdoing is mediated by perceptions of interpersonal interdependence among those connected to a wrongdoer, which in turn is associated with the use of CS models in perceiving social groups. In-group members will also unite against outsiders if they are perceived as posing a threat to the cohesion of the in-group. We theorize that ethnic violence and genocide occur when out-groups come to be viewed as disgusting threats of contamination that must be eliminated to preserve the integrity of the in-group.

Unity often facilitates intense care and sacrifice for those within the CS relation, but because the cohesion shared by those in a CS relation is typically experienced as a sense of common substantial essence (Fiske, 2004), any sort of difference may pollute the CS relationship. Intensely felt, culturally institutionalized CS relations commonly entail taboos concerning food or sex, and violations of these taboos defile the relationship. The purity of such CS groups thus depends on not eating certain foods or not eating or drinking with outsiders, or not performing certain sexual acts or not having sexual relations with certain persons. Incest defiles the family, adultery defiles a marriage, and a higher caste person eating with a person of lower caste defiles the entire high caste, as does sexual relations with persons of lower caste. In northern India, marriages with noncaste members or individuals outside of recognized community boundaries have even resulted in community leaders and family members opting to kill the young couples involved (Flintoff, 2010).

This tension between restoring Unity by healing and reincorporating while simultaneously wishing to restore Unity by cleansing and expunging is evident in many cultures. In some cultures, a family member who engages in homosexual relations is degraded and may be cast out of the family. Pedophiles who sexually abuse children are separated from their families and communities; one can even imagine being motivated to kill a family member who repeatedly commits incest. In the United States, the male partner of a rape victim may feel the woman has been “damaged” by the rape and may avoid sexual contact with her (Rodkin, Hunt, & Cowan, 1982, p. 95). Likewise, early Christian theodicy interpreted suffering as defilement, so that a victim of misfortune evoked dread of contagious impurity; to avoid contamination, the community would exile the sufferer (Ricoeur, 1967). Similarly, in regard to the treatment of excommunicates, it was stated that “no Christian should eat or drink with them, or give them a kiss, or speak with them” (Peace Council of Elne-Toulouges, AD 1027, as quoted in Head & Landes, 1992, p. 335). In the West, this Unity motive, emotionally experienced as disgust, long led to the enforced segregation of victims of leprosy and, more recently, to avoidance of people infected with HIV—regardless of whether the afflicted person had any control over becoming infected. These attitudes are analogous to one’s feelings about surgical removal of a cancerous organ or limb: It is sad to lose a body part but wise and wonderful to be purified of the cancer.

In honor cultures, a woman who has sexual relations outside marriage, even against her will, defiles her family, which is shamed and shunned. Other families will not marry members of the defiled family and often will not eat or drink or socialize with them. The only way to remove the family’s shame and reintegrate the family into the community is to kill the polluted woman. Hence the celebration that occurred following Zahra Al-Azzo’s killing reflects an attempt to reestablish Unity, both within the family and within the community.² From this perspective, difference in our moral response to rape lies in the manner in which the CS model between daughter, family, and community has been constituted and how the impact of rape on these CS relations is construed. Some communities view the defilement caused by rape to be beyond repair, and others view it as less threatening. The moral motive of Unity is the same but is resolved differently, leading to expulsion and care, respectively. Thus, although Westerners may find the act horrific, honor killing emerges out of the same moral motive as our own responses to rape. For the communities in which honor killing occurs, the act is quintessentially moral because it redresses a fundamental violation of an essential social relationship.

Ethnological and historical evidence from many cultures suggest that the strongest cues to constituting CS relations and their corresponding motives for Unity involve indexical cues of bodily similarity, including intimate touch and sex, nursing, blood-sharing rituals, body modifications and marking (e.g., genital modifications, facial scarification, matching tattoos, uniforms), and rhythmic, synchronous movement (e.g., marching, dancing, being carried) (Fiske, 2004). Combining several of these, as is often the case in adolescent initiation rites or boot camp, creates strong feelings of Unity and fosters a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for one’s mates (Dulaney & Fiske, 1994). Mimicry, synchronous activity, and the sensation of touch have been found to increase pro-social behavior, such as when waitresses receive larger tips after they repeat the words of their customers (van Baaren, Holland, Steengart, & van Knippenberg, 2003), or when participants cooperate more in economic games after walking in step with each other or singing in unison (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) or receiving a short massage (Morhenn, Park, Piper, & Zak, 2008). RR predicts that Unity may also be constituted by seeking out and emphasizing sources of commonality among those in the group, including interests, values, and beliefs (for related perspectives, see Durkheim, 1893/2008; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). Thus, cues to similarity and group membership can increase in-group favoritism and out-group hostility (Sherif, 1956; Tajfel et al., 1971), and even sharing a birthday increases cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game (Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998). Historical analyses have also found that Union soldiers in the Civil War who had social commonalities with each other, such as

² Honor and shame also involve an element of AR in the relation between men and women, because fornication threatens the authority of fathers, husbands, and brothers. The cultural evolution of the social-relational models and how they are construed is a fascinating question in its own right. The Unity and Hierarchy motives that underlie honor and shame emerged in pastoral societies where there was little or no overarching political authority (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Schneider, 1971). In such societies, the only way a family could protect its chattel was through its reputation for violent reprisal (Wilson & Daly, 1992).

belonging to the same religion or race or coming from the same town, were more likely to risk their lives for their military company by staying rather than deserting (Costa & Kahn, 2003).

Hierarchy

On March 16, 1968, a company of U.S. soldiers led by Lt. William Calley entered the hamlet of My Lai, Vietnam, and murdered over 500 civilians, primarily women and children. At his trial, Calley argued that he murdered the civilians because he was following orders and respected the authority of his superiors. Such incidents are not uncommon in wartime, and Nazi officers made similar arguments to explain their acts of genocide during World War II, as did the guards in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal.

(“My Lai Massacre,” 2010).

The moral motive in AR models is Hierarchy. Hierarchy is directed toward creating and maintaining linear ranking in social groups. Subordinates are motivated to respect, obey, and pay deference to the will of superiors, such as leaders, ancestors, or gods, and to punish those who disobey or disrespect them. Superiors, in turn, feel a sense of pastoral responsibility toward subordinates and are motivated to lead, guide, direct, and protect them. Unlike theories of social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or system justification (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), RMT does not take the position that hierarchies are inherently immoral, exploitive, or even undesirable. Nor do legitimate hierarchies emerge out of pure force or coercion. In many cultures, people perceive hierarchy as natural, inevitable, necessary, and legitimate (Fiske, 1991; Nisbet, 1993; Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In our own lives, Hierarchy is experienced when we expect our edicts to be followed by those under our care, such as our children, students, or supporters, as well as that they give us the respect we deserve as their parents, teachers, or leaders. In turn, we feel morally obligated to guide, protect, and stand up for them.

Whereas the social-interactionist perspective assumes that truly moral judgments cannot ever be based on the will of authorities (Turiel, 1983), RR posits that motives for Hierarchy create moral expectations that individuals at the top of the hierarchy are entitled to more and better things than individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy. People generally believe that deans are entitled to bigger offices, better furniture, and higher stipends than graduate students. Likewise, Homans (1953) found that ledger clerks at a company were upset that less important employees received identical pay, even though the ledger clerks believed their pay was otherwise fair and that they would not receive better wages at any other company. Similarly, Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky (2010) found that individuals who were primed to feel an elevated sense of power judged their own hypothetical moral transgressions, such as stealing a bicycle, more leniently than the same transgressions committed by others. This discrepancy disappeared when participants believed their power was illegitimate in some way, suggesting that these feelings of entitlement occur within an AR model motivated by Hierarchy rather than feelings of coercive power. Although superiors may feel a greater sense of entitlement, they are also perceived as being morally responsible for the actions of their subordinates (Shultz, Jaggi, & Schleifer, 1987). When coupled with Unity, Hierarchy may motivate individuals to rank social groups, with the in-group at the top and the out-group at the bottom. For example, during the Nazi rise to power, the Nazis passed a set of animal rights laws that ranked humans and animals

alike on a hierarchical scale in which Aryans, wolves, and eagles were at the top of the scale and Jews and rats were at the bottom. By virtue of these positions, Nazis reasoned they could legitimately experiment on Jews (Sax, 2000). Similarly, superiors may order subordinates to commit violence for a variety of immoral or morally motivated reasons,³ but subordinates will often follow through with the violence because they are employing an AR model and its corresponding Hierarchy motive, in which they are morally obligated to obey the will of superiors.

AR relations and their corresponding Hierarchy motives are constituted iconically through force, magnitude, space, and time (Fiske, 2004). Ethnological and historical evidence suggests that those in authority are often presented as greater in force, physically higher in space, larger, in front, or temporally preceding. Leaders often use clothing and headdresses to increase their size and height, and subordinates bow or prostrate themselves before them. Experimentally, in economic games such as Ultimatum, wherein a “proposer” is given a sum of money and has to make a one-time offer to a “responder” who can either accept or reject the offer, it has been found that assigning the proposer role based on rank from scores on a previous quiz led to lower offers than when role assignments were random (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994).

Equality

In 1991, a fight between children of the El-Hanashat and Abdel-Halim clans in Egypt ended in two deaths, sparking a blood feud. The most recent murders were in 2002, when 22 El-Hanashat members were gunned down. In response, a surviving El-Hanashat stated “no matter what sacrifices it takes, we are determined to kill as many of them [Abdel-Halims] as were murdered.” —Halawi (2002)

The moral motive in EM models is Equality. Equality is directed toward enforcing even balance and in-kind reciprocity in social relations. It requires equal treatment, equal say, equal opportunity, equal chance, even shares, even contributions, turn taking, and lotteries (e.g., for conscription, for a dangerous assignment, for choosing ends of the field in sports). Equality provides the moral motivation for maintaining “scratch my back and I will scratch yours” forms of reciprocity and pursuing eye-for-an-eye forms of revenge. Thus, Equality accounts for the sense of obligation we feel both in inviting people to our home after they have invited us to theirs and in seeking to hurt people precisely the way they have hurt us.

Equality motives for keeping track of whose turn it is and tracking costs and benefits to ensure that they have been distributed equally are reflected in analyses of equality-based forms of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975; Folger et al., 1995), as well as the expectation of balanced reciprocal benefits in exchange relationships (Mills & Clark, 1994). Equality motivates individuals to be more sensitive to receiving the same amount as someone than to the total amount they receive (Bazerman, White, & Lowenstein,

³ In addition to possible immoral motives, Calley may have felt moral motivation to instigate the My Lai Massacre if he viewed all Vietnamese as polluting threats to his group (Unity), believed he was morally bound by orders from superiors (Hierarchy), felt he should “even the score” for American deaths at the hands of Vietnamese (Equality), or believed that killing innocents was justified if it weakened the morale of enemy soldiers (Proportionality).

1995). Similarly, people often use an Equality heuristic in determining fair allocations among groups of individuals (Allison & Messick, 1990; Messick & Schell, 1992). For example, responders in the Ultimatum game often reject offers that are not a 50–50 split, even though this results in neither party receiving any money (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). We theorize that Equality motivates individuals to enforce tit-for-tat strategies in their interactions, in which individuals initially cooperate and then reciprocate their partner's actions in kind (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). In legal systems, Equality motivates third parties to punish criminals in-kind for their crimes. Examples include the accepted use of the death penalty for those convicted of murder in the United States as well as the recent controversy surrounding a Saudi Arabian judge's inquiries into whether a man found guilty of assault could have his spinal cord medically severed, as per the request of his paralyzed victim (Jamjoom & Ahmed, 2010).

EM relations and their corresponding Equality motives are constituted through the concrete operations of the relational acts themselves, such as turn taking, tit-for-tat, or random assortment (Fiske, 2004). These acts consist of either a definite one-for-one balance or a statistical balance of opportunity through randomization. It has been hypothesized that the salience of random assignment to roles and use of terms such as *divide* support 50–50 splits in the standard version of the Ultimatum game (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1996).

Proportionality

In 1996, during an interview on the television program *60 Minutes* with then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the following exchange took place in regard to U.S. sanctions on Iraq:

Lesley Stahl: We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that's more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?

Albright: I think this is a very hard choice, but the price—we think the price is worth it. —Hewitt (1996)

The moral motive in MP models is Proportionality. Proportionality is directed toward calculating and acting in accord with ratios or rates for otherwise distinct goods to ensure that rewards or punishments for each party are proportional to their costs, contributions, effort, merit, or guilt. Unlike our earlier example of the death penalty, U.S. law does not ever require that someone convicted of assault be assaulted in turn. Rather, the judge is expected to hand down a sentence that is proportionate to the crime in terms of time the defendant must serve or a fine that must be paid. Similarly, in a number of cultures (e.g., ancient Egypt), people expect that their fate in the afterlife will depend on the weighing of all their good and bad deeds on the scales of justice, implying a belief that the morality of all sorts of acts can be weighed on the same scale (Pritchard, 1954). The primary violation of Proportionality is cheating, whereby we strictly define the term as referring to instances in which individuals attempt to gain benefits that, according to cultural standards, are not proportional to what they deserve.

As echoed in equity-based forms of justice (Deutsch, 1975; Folger et al., 1995), Proportionality does not imply that individuals will attempt to exploit each other to maximize their own benefits. For example, Adams (1963) found that when students felt that they were being overpaid for proofreading, they worked harder so as to

reduce the inequity they perceived between their lack of qualifications and the pay they were receiving. At the same time, hostility toward welfare or “handouts” may be based in Proportionality motives, whereby people are entitled to keep what they have earned and no one should receive something for nothing. Thus, people who believe that effort is important for life success are less likely to support welfare (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Fong, 2001), suggesting that they believe people who are poor have not put in enough effort to deserve their help.

We theorize that people are motivated by Proportionality when making moral trade-offs that require doing harm or giving up some good in order to bring about a greater moral good. For example, a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits may lead us to judge that sacrificing one person is worth saving five people when in a moral dilemma (Foot, 1967; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). In real-world contexts, Proportionality motives are used to frame judgments regarding acceptable losses for bringing about greater goods, such as in moral assessments of the acceptability of collateral damage, or in the use of kill ratios to justify sacrificing military personnel. For example, in justifying the decision to use atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then U.S. President Harry Truman stated that “a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities” (Alperovitz, 1996, p. 516). More generally, utilitarian morality relies on ratio scales of consequences, where good and bad outcomes can be scaled as proportions and multiplied by the number of people affected (Mill, 1863).

MP relations and their corresponding Proportionality motives are constituted symbolically. For example, the most ubiquitous MP symbol is money. It has no intrinsic value, and yet it can be used in exchange for a variety of goods (Fiske, 2004). Experimentally, Heyman and Ariely (2004) found that offering low monetary compensation for a task led individuals to exert less effort than when they received no compensation at all. Heyman and Ariely hypothesized that mentioning monetary compensation constituted an MP model of helping in which individuals calibrated their helping behavior to the level of compensation they received, whereas in the absence of compensation participants constituted a CS model in which they helped to the extent of their ability (for similar results, see Gneezy & Rustich, 2000). Similarly, when deciding the fairest way to allocate bonuses in a company, equal allocation among all employees is less favored for monetary bonuses than for nonmonetary bonuses, such as food or vacation time (DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010).

Null morality. Positing that different social-relational models entail different moralities raises the question of what moral obligations exist when relevant social relationships are absent or are not activated and attended to. Similar to notions of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) and dehumanization (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), RR predicts that the lack of any kind of relationship motivation leads to moral indifference. For example, Brandt (1954) found that among Hopi Indians, children were allowed to capture and inflict pain on birds. When probed, the Hopi were fully aware that the birds were suffering; they were simply unconcerned with the birds' plight. Cross-culturally, it has often been the case that people recognize certain rules and prohibitions within established community boundaries but perceive no such obligations outside of those boundaries. Thus in the Philippines, Ilongot young men who were grieving, morose, or dimin-

ished felt no compunctions about seeking catharsis by cutting off the heads of strangers and, indeed, were feted and honored for doing so (Rosaldo, 1980).

Conflicting Moralities

RR suggests that conflicting moral judgments and behaviors may be due in part to individuals and groups constituting different social-relational models and corresponding moral motives for otherwise identical situations. Moreover, third parties will disagree over correct policies and practices if they employ different social-relational models as frameworks for interpreting the morality of actions. Consequently, RR radically departs from existing theories that must attribute acts of violence to nonmoral biases (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Turiel, 1983), equate fairness with equal treatment toward all persons (Haidt, 2007; Turiel, 1983), and consider the “purity” of actions as independent of their social-relational contexts (Haidt, 2007; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).

Morality of violence. For theories of moral psychology that argue that the bases for moral judgments and behaviors always include prohibitions against intentional harm or battery (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Turiel, 1983), support for violence can only be interpreted as a moral violation, an error in moral performance, or a necessary evil toward bringing about a greater good. Yet historically, harm to enemies, even their kin and children, was not seen as a necessary evil but was often viewed as morally praiseworthy. Beating one’s own children for disobedience, sometimes quite severely from a Western view, is also praiseworthy in many parts of the world, and across cultures, many people feel morally bound to harm those who have harmed them and to physically punish some transgressions. Some legal systems previously did or currently do impose corporal punishments for certain crimes, and a few cultures even condone execution. Moreover, in cultures and historical periods in which executions were public, they were often quite popular spectator events—as was the case with hangings in the United States during the 18th and 19th centuries—suggesting that corporal punishment is not always seen as a necessary evil. Even if we were to label all of these behaviors as errors in moral performance, we need a theory that can explain the pattern in such “errors.”

RR predicts that intentionally harming others will be perceived as more or less acceptable, and even morally praiseworthy, depending on the social-relational context within which it occurs (see Moio, 2007, for a similar perspective in analyzing torture). Such harm ranges from everyday verbal aggression to full-scale ethnic conflict. When engaging a CS model, individuals will be motivated by Unity, whereby violence directed toward the in-group is less acceptable than violence toward out-groups and violence is morally praiseworthy if the victim is perceived as a potential threat or contaminant to the in-group. At the same time, Hierarchy motivates people to judge that superiors committing violence against subordinates is more acceptable than vice versa and may even be praiseworthy if done to instruct or punish. Moreover, violence is more morally acceptable if committed under orders from superiors, and subordinates may view such violence as morally required. When motivated by Equality, violence will be judged as justifiable and perhaps even required if it is committed in retaliation for a previous transgression (i.e., eye-for-an-eye

revenge). RR also predicts that individuals will perceive violence as a necessary evil when they are motivated by Proportionality, whereby harm is acceptable if the benefits outweigh the costs.

Evidence supporting these predictions includes Cohen, Montoya, and Insko’s (2006) cross-cultural analysis of violence in small-scale societies, which found that violence toward out-groups is supported more than violence toward in-groups. The association is moderated by in-group loyalty, defined as a feeling of “we” directed toward the local community, as would be predicted if these attitudes emerge out of motives for Unity. In vignette experiments, participants are less likely to support sacrifice for the greater good in a moral dilemma when the sacrificial victim is described as a close relative (Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993), and extreme out-group members are the most likely to be sacrificed (Cikara, Farnsworth, Harris, & Fiske, 2010; Swann et al., 2010). These results suggest that participants may be motivated by Unity to preferentially direct violence toward out-group members and away from in-group members. Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, and Fessler (2007) found that participants did condone harm as morally appropriate when they perceived it as an accepted practice in a particular social-relational context, such as the case of 17th-century sailors being beaten for insubordination. RR suggests that harm is condoned in the case of 17th-century sailors because participants employed a Hierarchy motive that legitimizes the punitive beating of a sailor by a superior officer. Vignette experiments such as these are constructed to create conditions that minimize performance errors (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), suggesting that responses accurately reflect participants’ intuitions.

Regarding real-world moral disagreement, RR predicts that many disagreements regarding the acceptability of violence may be due to different individuals employing different moral motives to determine the criteria upon which moral judgments are made. Thus, when researchers who experiment on animals argue that killing a small number of animals is morally justified because their deaths save a much greater number of human lives, they are appealing to Proportionality motives. Such utilitarian justifications are likely effective because most people view most nonhuman animals as outside of the scope of moral concerns (Opotow, 1993; Singer, 1975). These justifications may fail to sway animal rights activists not because they have calculated the costs and benefits differently, but because the activists may be using a CS model to understand crucial aspects of the relationship between humans and animals, whereby such a trade-off would be morally prohibited.

Fairness. Whereas other theories assume that fairness implies impartiality and equal treatment (Haidt, 2007; Turiel, 1983), RR predicts that even and balanced treatment will only be judged as fair if one is employing an Equality motive. Equal treatment—ranging from dividing food equally to requiring everyone to pay the same amount for parking to providing equal legal rights to every person—will be morally prohibited when one is employing a Hierarchy motive, whereby superiors are entitled to greater rights and responsibilities, or a Proportionality motive, whereby rights and responsibilities should be proportional to merit, effort, contribution, or ability. If one is employing a Unity motive, in-group members will feel entitled to preferential treatment over out-group members. Within the group, those motivated by Unity will feel they should simply give what is needed, as it is rude to explicitly keep track of how much each individual takes and contributes—it is unseemly to be concerned about equality. Furthermore, the

notion of stealing may be nonsensical when employing a Unity motive, whereby those within the CS relation can take freely from each other, or a Hierarchy motive, whereby superiors have dominion over all things and are entitled to appropriate what they want or need.

Evidence supporting these predictions includes Clark and Waddell's (1985) finding that failing to offer repayment for a favor increased perceptions of being exploited in partners led to expect an exchange relationship but not in partners led to expect a communal relationship. If those who expected communal relationships were employing CS models to interpret the interaction, they would have viewed demands for immediate reciprocity as a moral violation of Unity motives that require sharing freely. In regard to Hierarchy, Hoffman et al. (1994) found that proposers made lower offers in the Ultimatum game when they were assigned to their position based on high scoring ranks on an earlier quiz. High scorers' lower offers did not result in increased rejection rates. Further studies are needed to determine if proposers and responders employed Hierarchy motives whereby higher ranking individuals deserved more.

With regard to real-world moral disagreement, arguments in favor of affirmative action are often framed in terms of Equality, whereby different ethnicities should be placed on equal footing, and arguments against affirmative action are typically framed in terms of Proportionality, whereby college admittance should be given to the most academically proficient and talented students, regardless of color. When actions that are fair when people employ a Proportionality motive, such as asking how much one would have to pay for a good or service, are undertaken in domains in which people typically employ other moral motives, participants find the behaviors quite immoral, such as when asked how much monetary compensation would be fair for purchasing U.S. citizenship (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Ginges et al. (2007) found that inclusion of monetary incentives actually increased opposition to compromise proposals regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict for some participants. RR suggests that such taboo “trade-offs” over sacred values occur because Unity dictates that cost–benefit analyses in which individuals within the CS group are treated as commodities that can be weighed against each other are morally despicable. When someone offers you a million dollars for your daughter, you do not counter with three million—you regard the offer as heinously offensive.

Purity. There have been two other major attempts to transcend Western philosophical preconceptions of morality and construct a theory of moral psychology that more accurately reflects the types of moral judgments and behaviors present across situations and cultures (for a review, see Sunar, 2009). Shweder et al. (1997) argued that there are three moral codes: *autonomy*, which captures concerns with harms and rights; *community*, which consists of beliefs about duty and following communal will; and *divinity*, which refers to conceptions of the body as a sacred temple that must remain pure. The moral foundations theory (MFT) of Haidt and colleagues (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008) represents an extension of the three moral codes, positing that there are five innately prepared foundations to our moral psychology. Prohibitions against harm (*harm/care*) and predispositions toward Trivers' (1971) notion of reciprocal altruism (*fairness/reciprocity*; see Triv-

ers, 1971) map onto Shweder et al.'s autonomy code, commitment to our social groups (*in-group/loyalty*) and respect for those higher in the hierarchy (*authority/respect*) map onto the community code, and moral reactions of disgust against spiritual or physical contagions that must be avoided (*purity/sanctity*) map onto the divinity code.

RR adds to MFT (and, by extension, the three moral codes) by grounding the foundations in a theory of social relationships and thereby predicting when and how people will rely on one foundation over another. As indicated above, RR argues that intentional harm may be positively or negatively valenced, while the form that fairness takes varies depending on the moral motive employed. Also, whereas the authority/respect foundation emphasizes the moral obligations of subordinates toward superiors, our Hierarchy motive also focuses on the obligations of superiors to direct, lead, guide, and protect subordinates and predicts that people will use the authority/respect foundation when they are employing an AR model to navigate their social relationships. Finally, RR predicts that concerns with purity emerge when people are engaged in CS models and motivated by Unity to uphold group boundaries and avoid contamination of our groups. Consequently, the foundations of in-group/loyalty and purity/sanctity are actually variants of the same social-relational regulation motive.

RR predicts that “impure” moral acts (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), such as odd sexual fetishes, will be judged negatively and punished because they pollute and endanger the cohesion of the social group. Other examples of purity/sanctity violations include reacting morally to incest, washing a toilet with a national flag, and eating the family dog after it was accidentally run over by a car (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2008). Yet, what is upsetting about incest is that it is a violation of a particular constellation of kinship relationships; indeed, specific configurations of kinship relationships define what constitutes incest. In some cultures, sexual relations with your older brother's wife, or with your father's brother's daughter, are incest; in other cultures, where CS relationships are constituted differently, sexual relations or marriage among these kin are prescribed. Similarly, washing toilets with a national flag is judged as immoral because nations symbolize meaningful social groups, so we predict that people will cast harsher moral judgments of such acts when they identify strongly with their nationality. At the same time, people may find the prospect of eating an animal morally disgusting and abominable when they identify with the animal (either as a species or as an individual; Durkheim, 1915). Conversely, without a CS relationship with a species, people may have no moral and culinary reason not to eat it. Indeed, many American Indian, East Asian, and other cultures traditionally raised and ate dogs, and experimentally, participants who had recently been manipulated to eat beef were less likely to include cows in their moral circle (Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010). Moreover, taboos against eating certain animals are important constituents of the CS relationships of totemic clans and the CS identity of Jews, Muslims, and Brahmins (for a review, see Whitehead, 2000). Similarly, castes (*jati*) in South Asia and elsewhere are constituted in part by moral rules against eating with outsiders, moral strictures against caste women having sex with outsiders, and other contact-avoidance rules whereby violations are morally disgusting and horrifying (Dumont, 1980).

That Unity violations are often tied to physical contact or bodily incorporation may be due to the indexical constitutive cues of CS that rely on such mechanisms. Note also that these Unity violations may sometimes become coupled with motives for Hierarchy in religiously based concerns where individuals cast Unity-violating acts as disobedience to God's will or injury to God's flock. Last, consistent with a RR account, behaviors that would otherwise be disgusting and elicit negative moral judgments are nonetheless often perceived as morally good if used to build group cohesion, such as in the case of college hazing rituals or initiation rites (Dulaney & Fiske, 1994).

Shweder et al.'s (1997) and Haidt and Joseph's (2004, 2008) attempts to expand the sphere of moral concerns beyond issues of harms and rights have ignited invaluable theoretical discourse and experiments meant to disentangle what types of judgments and behaviors should be considered "moral" (Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009; Turiel et al., 1987). Although this is an important topic within the field of moral psychology, RR moves beyond arguments related to labeling. Thus, regardless of whether one wishes to identify judgments and behaviors related to violence, inequality, or impure acts as morally motivated or not, RR predicts when and how people will engage in such judgments and behaviors depending on which social-relational models and corresponding moral motives are active.

Future Directions

The reconceptualization of moral psychology as RR and the identification of four fundamental moral motives can illuminate the nature of freedom, the connection between moral psychology and religion, the study of moral emotions, moral development, and the neurobiological underpinnings of our moral psychology.

Freedom from relationships. In some cultures, freedom—autonomy, independence—is a core moral and political value. Historically, freedom is rooted in anti-AR motives that restrict the legitimate reach of authority (Boehm, 1999), as well as the spread of MP relations into one domain after another, as first recognized by Marx (1848/1972), Maine (1861/1963), Tönnies (1887/1957), and Durkheim (1893/2008). The commoditization of labor, land, exchange, and time depends upon freedom to choose where to work, how to use land, what to produce and what to consume, and how to spend time. Commoditization turns commodities into objects of free choice. This requires people to make choices based on preferences they must formulate, thereby training people to form explicit preferences and demand the freedom to make choices based on them. Future research should explore how restriction of AR has combined with expansion of MP to form the integrated psychocultural construct of freedom. In particular, how does "freedom" interact with other moral motives to restrict the scope of some social-relational (and consequently moral) obligations, such that beyond these boundaries people can and *should* pursue their own interests without regard to the needs and desires of others and any attempts to forcibly impose social-relational obligations are regarded as illegitimate.

Religion as relationship regulation. For the great majority of people in nearly all cultures throughout history, morality has been inextricably intertwined with religion. Indeed, for many people in many cultures, morality *is* religion: What is good consists of what the gods command or the ancestors will, observance

of religious taboos that have intrinsic sanctions, or the correct performance of religious rituals (Durkheim, 1915/1965). Although modern theories of moral psychology have generally neglected religious morality (for exceptions, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Shweder et al., 1997) a social-relational theory of morality naturally encompasses religion, because the core of most religions consists of social relationships with supernatural beings and among members of the congregation (Horton, 1960).

Religions often emphasize the need for respect and paternal responsibility. Hierarchy motivates followers to obey, respect, and praise gods, spirits, or ancestors. If these supernatural beings prohibit lying or stealing or adultery, such actions are ipso facto moral violations because they are acts of disobedience against these beings' will (e.g., Old Testament). Unity motivates followers of some religions to continually move toward and become one with God (e.g., New Testament). Religious taboos are often directly or indirectly concerned with protecting social relationships with others in the community, especially CS relations. Many religious rituals consist largely of affirming CS and AR social interactions with supernatural beings or among the congregants; totemic relations with animals are distinctly motivated by Unity. Sacrifices and libations, communion, baptism, marriage, funerals, initiations, and many healing rituals constitute CS relationships with gods and among participants in congregations.

Eastern religions also motivate RR. Confucianism focuses on filial piety (Hierarchy), reciprocity (Equality), and other social-relational obligations (Young, 1983). Buddhism is structured by a worshipful AR relationship with the Buddha and, as actually practiced, often revolves around EM and other relationships with various supernatural beings (Spiro, 1967). The revered (Hierarchy) paradigms of Mahayana Buddhism are bodhisattvas who, motivated by profound compassion (Unity), seek to help others reach enlightenment and liberation. A foundation of Taoism is the teaching of Laozi about the Three Treasures:

Here are my three treasures. Guard and keep them!

The first is pity [compassion, love, kindness];

the second, frugality [economy, not-wasting];

the third, refusal to be "foremost of all things under heaven".

For only he that pities is truly able to be brave;

Only he that is frugal is able to be profuse.

Only he that refuses to be foremost of all things

Is truly able to become chief of all Ministers. (Waley, 1958)

Thus, the Three Treasures of Taoism are manifestations of Unity, Proportionality, and Hierarchy, though in practice, Taoism consists primarily of Hierarchy-driven worship of ancestor spirits and the eight immortals. The core of Jainism is Unity as universal compassion for all things. In general, religious moralities consist of paradigms and precepts for relationships between humans and supernatural beings and relationships among the humans who worship them.

Moral emotions. Moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eisenberg, 2000; Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Hoffman, 1982), disgust (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009), contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), outrage (Goodenough, 1997; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), guilt and

shame (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Fessler, 2004; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), pride and deference (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), gratitude (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), elevation (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010; Silvers & Haidt, 2008), and embarrassment (Keltner & Anderson, 2000) function as proximate mechanisms for the moral motives by evaluating the social-relational potential of others, generating the desire to enter into social relationships with others, and regulating existing social relationships (Fiske, 2002, 2010a; Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Further studies are necessary to reveal whether these and other moral emotions indeed map onto the particular kinds of social-relational models theorized by RMT and their corresponding moral motives. RR predicts that disgust, which has been linked to feelings of moral contamination and violations of purity, will be experienced most in response to violations of Unity, while emotions such as compassion and empathy will facilitate Unity motives toward caring for others in the group who are in need or have been harmed. At the same time, pride may support feelings of entitlement and responsibility among superiors that are motivated by Hierarchy, while respect and awe may facilitate subordinates in deferring to superiors. Gratitude is predicted to facilitate Equality motives that demand reciprocity in response to benefits received.

Moral development. In a series of studies, Hamlin and colleagues (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2010) found that infants as young as 3 months preferred “helper” blocks that aid a “struggling” block up an incline, compared to “hinderer” blocks that push the struggling block down. Even more intriguingly, Hamlin and colleagues have found that infants as young as 8 months preferred a puppet who helped a previously helpful puppet to one who hindered a previously helpful puppet. Moreover, they found that infants preferred a puppet that “punished” a previously antisocial puppet to a puppet that helped a previously antisocial puppet (Hamlin et al., 2010). These findings indicate that young infants do not have a simple aversion to harmful behavior that blocks another’s intentions but are capable of very complex social cognition incorporating motives for punishment. Similarly, Over and Carpenter (2009) found that priming 18-month-old infants with pictures that had images of social affiliation in the background increased infants’ spontaneous helping behavior immediately following the prime. Future research will be required to determine the extent to which such cognition requires consideration of relevant social relationships versus more basic perceptions and appraisals.

RR also predicts that because relational models increase in cognitive complexity from CS to MP (Fiske, 1992), sensitivity to their corresponding moral motives should follow accordingly. This hypothesis is partially supported by Piaget’s (1932/1965) finding that children’s sense of egalitarianism emerged following an orientation to authority in the same manner that RMT predicts Equality motives will develop after Hierarchy motives. Further experiments are needed to determine whether the relational models and their corresponding moral motives emerge in a fixed order, cumulating to expand children’s developing moral repertoire.

Neuroscientific underpinnings of relationship regulation. Neuroscientific research in moral psychology has been dominated by studies focusing on whether processing of moral dilemmas occurs via reasoning or emotion (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et

al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto, Ladavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2010). Recent studies have indicated the right temporoparietal junction as important for processing intentions in moral judgments (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). RR suggests that what is needed now is further understanding of the areas of the brain that are likely to be involved in processing social relationships (Iacoboni et al., 2004; see Chiao et al. 2008, for investigations into the neural underpinnings of hierarchy) as well as motivating them, such as those indicated in patients with frontotemporal dementia and patients with prefrontal lesions who are deficient in moral emotions and social motives (Fiske, 2010a; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005).

Conclusion

Moral Psychology as Relationship Regulation

With some notable exceptions (Haidt, 2007; Shweder et al., 1997), approaches to moral psychology have traditionally followed the post-Enlightenment philosophical axiom that the bases for moral judgments and behaviors are restricted to rational, impartial, logical, universal principles of right actions. Consequently, studies of moral psychology have focused on examining moral judgments about actions independent of the social-relational contexts in which they naturally occur. In contrast, we have posited RR, in which moral motives, judgments, and behavior act to regulate and sustain the social relationships that are necessary for living in groups. We have categorized four fundamental, distinct moral motives aimed toward Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality that are constituted in four social-relational models people use to navigate their social relationships. These moral motives are very often incommensurable with each other, meaning that any given action may be considered right, just, and fair in the framework of one moral motive while being wrong, unjust, and unfair when employing a different moral motive.

The incommensurability of the models does not imply that there are no immoral motives. Within social groups and cultures, there are situations in which there is implicit or explicit consensus among all parties on the appropriate social-relational model to determine morally appropriate behavior. Individuals may violate the requirements of moral motives for any number of reasons (e.g., temptation, shortsighted self-interest), and such action would be considered a genuine moral violation in our framework. Although individuals may justify their actions in terms of another moral motive so as to draw on rationales to which other individuals can relate, such post hoc reframing of a situation in no way makes the action moral. To prevent violations of moralities we wish to sustain, RR suggests, we should direct our efforts toward constituting social relationships. For example, Equality motives to enforce balanced exchange will increase if randomness of selection, turn taking, or concrete one-to-one matching procedures are emphasized. Likewise, building a sense of shared essence among individuals should generate Unity motives that foster a greater willingness to take care of each other and a greater sense of safety through increased trust. Conversely, some forms of monitoring and mental bookkeeping may deconstitute communal sharing, as

suggested by findings that monitoring can reduce cooperation and shift construals of the situation toward a business model equivalent to market pricing (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). To the extent that a social-relational model is constituted, an individual will have moral motivation to counteract immoral motives.

Moral disagreement. RR predicts that genuine moral disagreements may result from individuals and groups applying different relational models to the same situation rather than merely disagreeing about the relevant facts. For example, Connelly and Folger (2004) found that one source of unrest in a company was that White men, African Americans, and women applied different relational models to advocate three competing bases for promotions. Similarly, Giessner and van Quaquebeke (in press) hypothesized that if leaders and their followers use different relational models, followers may view leaders as unethical. As moral motives are not always explicitly articulated in local cultural discourse, individuals can appear inconsistent or hypocritical if forced to justify their position using only the motives available (see Haidt, 2001, on moral dumbfounding). Thus, it has been found that although supporters of torture and other harsh interrogation techniques often defend their position using proportionality-based utilitarian justifications, support for such practices is best predicted by equality-based retribution motives (Carlsmith & Sood, 2008). RR suggests that recognizing the moral motives of all parties is the first step toward resolution of disagreements, because it enables opposing parties to understand their competing moral perspectives rather than condemn each other with reference to social-relational frameworks that are incongruent or unrepresentative of the actual motives underlying judgment (for cultural differences in available moral discourses, see Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001).

Moral disagreement can also occur within individuals, as they may face situations in which the appropriate moral motive is ambiguous. Additionally, people participate in multiple relationships, each with their own moral motives; often, these motives pull in different directions. Thus, if soldiers feel some sense of CS to all humans, killing an enemy can have traumatic consequences (Baum, 2004). Similarly, soldiers may feel morally motivated in their actions while they are in battle, but when they return home they may have difficulty reconciling what they have done with a new environment that constitutes different social-relational models and consequent moral motives and has no consistent process for reintegrating them into the social group. Ultimately, we must identify the socioecological conditions that support different social-relational models in order to understand how different circumstances lead individuals to favor one model and its corresponding moral motives over another (Kameda, Takezawa, & Hastie, 2005; Nettle, Panchanathan, Rai, & Fiske, 2010).

Ethical implications. Whereas the field of moral psychology is directed toward descriptively analyzing the bases for our moral judgments and behaviors, moral philosophy is directed toward determining how we ought to structure our societies and lead our lives. Efforts to elucidate moral psychology are important for guiding the development of prescriptive ethical conceptions insofar as contemporary philosophers seek to “naturalize” prescriptive ethics by taking into account human nature, culture, and development (Flanagan, Sarkissian, & Wong, 2008; Wong, 2006).⁴ According to Doris and Stich (2008), “An

ethical conception that commends relationships, commitments, or life projects that are at odds with the sorts of attachments that can reasonably be expected to take root in and vivify actual human lives is an ethical conception with—at best—a very tenuous claim to our assent.” By grounding itself in the “relationships, commitments, or life projects” that “vivify actual human lives,” RR delineates the constraints on the moral positions that make sense, while providing a conceptual language for debating moral issues.

The strength of RR is that it illuminates the fact that some judgments and behaviors, such as those related to violence toward others and unequal treatment, which we may view as prescriptively immoral and which some have described as resulting from non-moral, selfish, and social biases, can reflect genuine moral motives embedded in social relationships. What makes these practices seem foreign to us and sometimes abhorrent is that different groups or cultures understand otherwise identical situations with reference to different social-relational models or different implementations of the same model. What is true to the moral motives of one relational model may be antithetical to the moral motives of another. Of course, people often actively attempt to excuse or justify actions that violate one social relationship by reframing it as consistent with another kind of relationship. Moreover, political leaders, governments, and religions often select and promulgate the moral motive that best suits their own ends. However, RR suggests that people often would not willingly go along unless the ideologically legitimating framing resonated with the moral motives that people are ready to employ. Thus, a practice such as slavery may have served selfish interests, but slavery could not have taken hold and been maintained in any of the cultures in which it has been prevalent without Hierarchy motives to morally legitimize it.

This raises serious questions about the ways in which the natural foundations of morality may be used as rationales for judging cultural practices that we intuitively believe are immoral. If some prescriptively “evil” practices in the world are facilitated by the same moral motives that lead to prescriptively “good” outcomes, we cannot blind ourselves to this truth. This is not to say that we must accept horrific acts because they have a natural and objective basis in human moral psychology. We may and we should assess which moral motives best promote human health, well-being, and peace. But we must understand the moral psychological bases of acts we aim to deter if we are to foster the tolerance that is necessary to relate to each other and to develop the wisdom to combat practices we cannot condone. Efforts to change practices we find abhorrent, or to foster practices we deem good, will require us to understand which social-relational models are most conducive to human welfare under specific socioecological conditions. On the basis of this understanding, we must then work to constitute the social relations that generate the moral motives we seek to foster. We hope this review is a first step in that direction.

⁴ It should be noted that philosophers have long debated as to whether and how descriptive facts of moral psychology should be used to generate a prescriptive ethical theory (Doris & Stich, 2008; Hume, 1739/1978; Moore, 1903; Wilson, Dieterich, & Clark, 2003).

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**Call for Papers: Special Section on Theory and Data in Categorization:
Integrating Computational, Behavioral, and Cognitive Neuroscience Approaches**

The Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (JEP:LMC) invites manuscripts for a special section on approaches to categorization, to be compiled by guest editors Stephan Lewandowsky and Thomas Palmeri working together with journal Associate Editor Michael Waldmann.

The goal of the special section is to showcase high-quality research that brings together behavioral, computational, mathematical, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging approaches to understanding the processes underlying category learning. There has been some divergence between approaches recently, with computational-mathematical models emphasizing the unity of category-learning processes while neuropsychological models emphasize the distinction between multiple underlying memory systems. We are seeking articles that integrate cognitive neuroscience findings in designing models or interpreting results, and behavioral studies and modeling results that constrain neuroscientific theories of categorization. In addition to empirical papers, focused review articles that highlight the significance of cognitive neuroscience approaches to cognitive theory—and/or the importance of behavioral data and computational models on constraining neuroscience approaches—are also appropriate.

The submission deadline is **June 1st, 2011**. The main text of each manuscript, exclusive of figures, tables, references, or appendixes, should not exceed 35 double-spaced pages (approximately 7,500 words). Initial inquiries regarding the special section may be sent to Stephan Lewandowsky (stephan.lewandowsky@uwa.edu.au), Tom Palmeri (thomas.j.palmeri@Vanderbilt.Edu), or Michael Waldmann (michael.waldmann@bio.uni-goettingen.de).

Papers should be submitted through the regular submission portal for *JEP: LMC* (<http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/xlm/submission.html>) with a cover letter indicating that the paper is to be considered for the special section. For instructions to authors and other detailed submission information, see the journal Web site at <http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/xlm>.